

# Computational Rationality

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# Acknowledgements

Many thanks to


*Joshua Cole, Matt Gray, Kee Siong Ng, and Tim Sears*

## Architectures for Rational Agents


## Applications to Recommender Systems and other Domains

## Current and Future Work

# Agents




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
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
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
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
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
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
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- ▶ Social

## Rational Agents

*“For each possible percept sequence, a rational agent should select an action that is expected to maximise its performance measure, given the evidence provided by the percept sequence and whatever built-in knowledge the agent has”.*

Russell & Norvig, “Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach”

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  - ▶ The proposed architecture integrates logic, probability, and learning
- (J.W. Lloyd and T.D. Sears, "An Architecture for Rational Agents", DALT 2005, LNAI 3904, 51-71, 2006)
- ▶ The rationality principle adopted is that of *maximum expected utility*.

# Belief Bases for Agents

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- ▶ 'Higher-order' means that functions can have other functions as arguments.

So, for example, a set can be represented by a predicate and manipulated by higher-order functions.

Generally, much use is made in the architecture of higher-order functions

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- ▶ Bach extends Escher mainly in that it also has a theorem prover and that its logic is modal

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
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- ▶ All this is (being) implemented by Alkemy

(J.W. Lloyd, "Logic for Learning", Springer, Cognitive Technologies, 2003)



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# Graphical Models



## Graphical Models



Sample space is explicit  
Random variables are functions


## Underlying Dynamics for Agents

Let  $S$  denote the set of states and  $A$  the set of actions.


The probability space of interest here is  $S \times A \times S$  which has some probability measure  $p$  defined on it.

Thus  $p(s, a, s')$  is the probability that if action  $a$  is applied to state  $s$  then state  $s'$  is reached.

By conditioning on states and actions, for each state  $s \in S$  and action  $a \in A$ , a transition probability distribution  $p(\cdot \mid s, a)$  is obtained.



## Evidence and Result Variables




The evidence variables  $E_i (i = 1, \dots, n)$  are chosen so as to assist the selection of a good action.

The result variables  $R_j (j = 1, \dots, m)$  are chosen so as to provide a good evaluation of the resulting state.

**Definition** A *belief base* is a theory consisting of the definitions of the evidence variables and (some of) the result variables.

# Influence Diagram



# Conditioned Influence Diagram

		$final \circ (R_1, \dots, R_m)$		
$initial \circ (E_1, \dots, E_n)$	$action$	$(w_{1,1}, \dots, w_{m,1})$	$\dots$	$(w_{1,l_1}, \dots, w_{m,l_m})$
$(v_{1,1}, \dots, v_{1,n})$	$a_1$	$p_{1,1}$	$\dots$	$p_{1,l_1 \dots l_m}$
$(v_{2,1}, \dots, v_{2,n})$	$a_2$	$p_{2,1}$	$\dots$	$p_{2,l_1 \dots l_m}$
$\dots$	$\dots$	$\dots$	$\dots$	$\dots$
$(v_{k,1}, \dots, v_{k,n})$	$a_k$	$p_{k,1}$	$\dots$	$p_{k,l_1 \dots l_m}$
		$u_1$	$\dots$	$u_{l_1 \dots l_m}$

# Applications

- ▶ Trading agents (TAC'05 competition at IJCAI'05)
- ▶ Recommender systems
- ▶ Poker

## TV Recommender

These ideas are illustrated with a TV recommender  
(part of a larger multi-agent system)

(J.J. Cole, M.J. Gray, J.W. Lloyd and K.S. Ng, "Personalisation for User Agents", AAMAS 05, 603-610, 2005)

Emphasis is on adaptation to the user's interests and preferences  
Personalisation component that could be added to TIVO

A state is a pair consisting of an occurrence and a status

An occurrence is a triple (date, time, channel)

Status is either *Unknown* or *Yes* or *No*

Actions are *RecommendYes* and *RecommendNo*

(turns *Unknown* into *Yes* or *No*)





## Belief Base for the TV Recommender

$\mathbf{B}_t$  ((*tv\_guide* ((20, 7, 2004), (20, 30), ABC)) = *Program*  
("The Bill", "", 50, [Drama], M,  
"Sun Hill continues to work at ... smuggling operation"))).

This fact states that the program on 20 July 2004 at 8.30pm on channel ABC has title "The Bill", no subtitle, a duration of 50 minutes, genre drama, a classification for mature audiences, and synopsis "Sun Hill continues to work at breaking the people smuggling operation".

The TV guide (obtained from the Web) contains information about ~4000 programs

## Belief Base for the TV Recommender 2

$likes\_tv\_program : Program \rightarrow \Omega$

$\mathbf{B}_t \mathbf{B}_u \forall_{Program} x.$

$((likes\_tv\_program\ x) =_{\Omega}$

$if\ (proj_{Title} \circ (=_{Title}\ "NFL\ Football"))\ x)\ then\ \top$

$else\ if\ (proj_{(List\ Genre)} \circ (listExists_1\ genre \circ (< 0)))\ x)\ then\ \perp$


$else\ if\ (proj_{Title} \circ StringToText \circ (listExists_1\ (=_{String}\ "sport")))\ x)\ then\ \top$

$else\ if\ (proj_{(List\ Genre)} \circ (listExists_1\ (=_{Genre}\ Current\_Affairs)))\ x)\ then\ \perp$

$\vdots$

$else\ \perp).$

# Learning Curve



## Belief Base for the TV Recommender 3

$tv\_time\_acceptable : Date \times Time \times Time \rightarrow \Omega$

$\mathbf{B}_t \mathbf{B}_u \forall_{Date} d. \forall_{Time} t. \forall_{Time} t'.$


$((tv\_time\_acceptable(d, t, t')) =_{\Omega}$

*if* (weekday  $d$ )  $\wedge$  ((proj<sub>Hour</sub>  $t$ )  $\geq 20$ )  $\wedge$  ((proj<sub>Hour</sub>  $t'$ )  $\leq 23$ ) *then*  $\top$

*else if*  $\neg$ (weekday  $d$ )  $\wedge$  ((proj<sub>Hour</sub>  $t$ )  $\geq 12$ )  $\wedge$  ((proj<sub>Hour</sub>  $t'$ )  $\leq 25$ ) *then*  $\top$

*else*  $\perp$ ).

## Influence Diagram for the TV Recommender



## Conditioned Influence Diagram for the TV Recommender

$initial \circ$ ( $ultp, udiary, uavail$ )	$action$	$final \circ (user, recomm)$				
		(T, Yes)	(T, No)	( $\perp$ , Yes)	( $\perp$ , No)	
(T, T, T)	<i>RecYes</i>	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.88
(T, T, T)	<i>RecNo</i>	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.2	0.20
(T, T, $\perp$ )	<i>RecYes</i>	0.4	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.64
(T, T, $\perp$ )	<i>RecNo</i>	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.6	0.60
(T, $\perp$ , T)	<i>RecYes</i>	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.40
(T, $\perp$ , T)	<i>RecNo</i>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.00
(T, $\perp$ , $\perp$ )	<i>RecYes</i>	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.40
(T, $\perp$ , $\perp$ )	<i>RecNo</i>	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.00
( $\perp$ , T, T)	<i>RecYes</i>	0.1	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.46
( $\perp$ , T, T)	<i>RecNo</i>	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.9	0.90
...	...	...	...	...	...	...
		1	0	0.4	1	

## Policy for the TV Recommender

*policy* : *State*  $\rightarrow$  *Action*

$\mathbf{B}_t \forall_{State} S.$

$((policy\ s) =_{Action}$

*if*  $((ultp\ s) =_{\Omega} \top) \wedge ((udary\ s) =_{\Omega} \top)$  *then* *RecYes*  
*else* *RecNo* $).$

# Interaction of Epistemic and Temporal Modalities

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The most relevant temporal modalities are ● ('last'), ■ ('always in the past'), ◆ ('sometime in the past'), and **S** ('since').

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Part of a belief base:

- $\mathbf{B} \forall_{\sigma} x. ((p \ x) =_{\Omega} \text{ if } x =_{\sigma} A \text{ then } \top \text{ else if } x =_{\sigma} B \text{ then } \top \text{ else } \perp)$
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- $\bullet^3 \mathbf{B} \forall_{\sigma} x. ((p \ x) =_{\Omega} \perp)$

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- $\bullet^3 \mathbf{B} \forall_{\sigma} x. ((p \ x) =_{\Omega} \perp)$

The following axiom models an agent with a form of perfect recall:

$$\bullet \mathbf{B}_i \varphi \longrightarrow \mathbf{B}_i \bullet \varphi$$

## Final Remarks

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- ▶ What comes next?
  - ▶ a general study of induction principles
  - ▶ putting the whole approach together
  - ▶ applications which show that the approach is fully convincing